Capital Flows to developing countries: does the emperor have clothes? by S Griffith-Jones (IDS, University of Sussex) and J Leape (LSE)
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 1 
   
 
 
Working Paper Number 89 
 
Capital Flows To Developing Countries: Does The Emperor Have Clothes? 
 
S Griffith-Jones* and J Leape 
 
 
This paper begins by examining the pattern of capital flows first to low-income countries, and 
then to emerging economies. In both cases, we see a dramatic collapse in the last several 
years. The evolving determinants of these trends in FDI flows (the principal category of 
private flows to low-income countries) and other capital flows are analysed. The behaviour 
of flows to emerging economies heavily influences both present and potential future flows to 
low-income countries. The paper concludes with the policy implications at both source 
























*   Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University 
 **   London School of EconomicsQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 2 
   





I  Introduction 
 
II  New pattern and sharp decline of private flows 
 
III  Policy implications 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 3 
   
 
I  Introduction 
 
Since the Asian crisis, there has been a collapse in private capital flows to low-income 
developing countries, and emerging economies alike, and sharp changes in the 
composition of these flows. According to World Bank data, net private flows to low-
income countries dropped from $32bn in 1997 to just $2bn in 1999, rising slightly to 
$4bn in 2000 (see Table 1 below). Net private capital flows to all emerging 
economies declined since 1997 and were practically zero in 2000 and 2001, according 
to IMF World Economic Outlook data shown in Table 2. 
 
Insufficient emphasis has been placed as yet by analysts and policy-makers on the 
nature, causes and policy implications of these large changes. A key question is 
whether these changes are mainly structural or cyclical. Though this is a difficult 
question to answer, it is very important to attempt to do so, given the different policy 
implications for all involved, but particularly for low-income developing countries. 
 
Indeed, one scenario is that recent trends continue for a long period. The surge in 
private capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s might have been, as the 
IMF November 2001 Emerging Market Financing Quarterly puts it, a “one-off 
portfolio stock adjustment” that has now run its’ course. This would imply that the 
presence of foreign companies, banks and other investors in developing economies 
would no longer contribute foreign exchange or external savings to these economies; 
their only contribution would be via transfers of technology, management know-how 
and other expertise. The latter is clearly important, particularly for certain categories 
of countries – such as low-income and transition economies. However, much of the 
value of foreign presence for developing countries is in the blend of both capital flows 
and transfer of expertise. If only transfer of expertise were to remain, the balance of 
benefits and costs would change quite significantly, as would the amount of policy 
and other effort that may be justified in trying to attract such flows. The emperor 
would have no clothes, or - more accurately - would be half-naked.  
 
The alternative scenario is that the sharp decline is mainly driven by general cyclical 
factors and the memory of recent crises. If this is the case – and if crises stop 
happening – then the pay-off is far greater for policy-makers (in developed and 
developing countries, as well as in international organisations), to make efforts to 
attract private flows to return to developing countries, as well as encouraging more 
those flows that are more stable.  
 
As already mentioned, for low-income economies, the evolution of private capital 
flows shows an equally disturbing picture since 1997, when these flows have 
collapsed, as discussed in detail in section II. The situation there is particularly 
worrying for two reasons. First, the decline is across the board, affecting all categories 
of inflows. In addition, the potential negative effect on growth and poverty reduction 
could be much larger. 
 
The issues to emerge most strongly from this study are those of risk, imperfect 
information and missing markets. All three of these issues have implications for the 
developed country investor demand for long-term assets and for the supply of long-
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they have profound implications for policy as well. The issues are clearly interrelated, 
as imperfect information contributes to missing markets – and vice versa – and both 
contribute to risk. But there are distinct issues that arise in each case that merit 
separate analysis. 
 
Risk is of fundamental relevance to investors, and has a direct influence on the price 
investors are willing to pay for an asset. Virtually all of the formal analysis in this 
area focuses on price risk – that is, the variance of total returns and their covariance 
with the returns of other assets. The financial crises of the 1990s, however, have 
demonstrated that liquidity risk is also a crucial factor influencing investors. 
 
More fundamentally, while portfolio theory takes risk as exogenous to the investor, it 
is now clear that both investor behaviour and developed-country policy decisions 
influence price risk. Price risk is endogenous to investor behaviour as a result of, 
among other factors, benchmarking of fund managers and changes in global risk 
aversion (and its interaction with liquidity risk) – both of which lead to strong herd 
behaviour among investors. The relevance of these factors has been evident in the 
large swings in the degree of correlation among emerging market assets in the last 
half of the 1990s – a pattern that cannot be explained by exogenous changes in 
“fundamentals”. Price risk is also endogenous to policy decisions, which affect the 
incentives and constraints imposed on investors. An important recent example in this 
area is the new Basle Capital Accord and the now well-documented implications for 
the cyclicality, cost and level of financing to developing countries. 
 
This endogeneity of risk to investor behaviour and to policy decisions underscores the 
importance of a developed-country policy response as part of any initiative to increase 
the supply of long-term capital to developing countries. 
 
While the endogeneity of developing country asset risk to developed-country policy 
decisions has only recently begun to attract attention, the endogeneity of such risk to 
host (developing) country policies has long received intensive scrutiny. As discussed 
in more detail below, one key issue in this area is that of political and economic 
stabilisation, and the related issue of policy consistency. 
 
The endogeneity of developing country asset risk to recipient country policy is closely 
related to the other themes of imperfect information and missing markets. An 
important component of the “international financial architecture” response to the 
crises of the 1990s has been an increased emphasis on transparency of country data 
and policies – as reflected particularly in the area of codes and standards. The crises – 
notably those in Mexico and Thailand – highlighted how imperfect information can 
contribute to the misallocation of capital flows, exacerbating booms and impeding 
necessary policy adjustments. These crises showed that it is not only the 
comprehensiveness and accuracy of information that matters but also its timeliness 
and regularity. The initiatives on codes and standards have been important in all these 
areas.  However, as many analysts have noted, improved information is not, in many 
circumstances, sufficient to improve the efficiency of the allocation of capital flows. 
 
While virtually all of the emphasis in this area has been on developing countries, it is 
worth remembering the LTCM debacle and the prolonged liquidity crisis that ensued. 
That crisis demonstrated that a lack of transparency in developed country financial QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 5 
   
markets is also a factor that contributes to instability and can have an adverse impact 
on the demand for developing country assets. 
 
A final theme in our analysis is the importance of missing markets. A distinguishing 
feature of long-term assets is the need for associated long-term contracts. Such 
contracts, in turn, require an institutional setting that includes well-defined property 
rights and effective enforcement mechanisms. It is therefore no surprise that recent 
research has highlighted the role of governance and property rights as impediments to 
investment. Another area in which missing markets are important is in the provision 
of long-term finance from domestic sources. Such finance can facilitate inward 
investment both directly, by providing an alternative source of funding, and indirectly, 
by stimulating domestic investment and by providing a domestic yield curve against 
which assets can more easily be priced. 
 
A related issue is that of the small and segmented nature of most low-income 
developing country markets. The small scale of most corporates in low-income 
countries is a factor not stressed in the literature, but one that we have established in 
interviews is a major constraint for both portfolio investment and bank lending to 
those countries. Market size and market access have been shown empirically to be key 
determinants of direct investment (e.g., Devereux and Griffith, 1998). These factors 
are also regularly cited by firms as a major obstacle to investment in Africa (e.g., the 
current CREFSA-CSAE survey of direct investors into Africa). 
 
The issues of market size and market access have been interpreted by the “new” trade 
theory as fundamentally related to trade costs. A now extensive literature has 
demonstrated the influence of such costs in determining not only the volume and 
direction of trade, but also the level and location of foreign direct investment. The 
magnitude of trade costs facing developing countries is determined primarily by three 
factors. The first of these is the economic trade costs such as those associated with 
weak transport and telecommunications infrastructure. These costs tend to be highest 
in the least developed economies. The second is the high costs of trading with 
partners in the region, as a result of the slow pace of moves towards creating larger 
regional markets. Africa, in particular, has a long history of regional integration 
initiatives, but few successes. Progress in reducing the impediments to trade among 
regional partners in Africa and in South Asia can have a significant impact on inward 
investment flows. The final, and perhaps most important issue, is that of access to 
developed markets. The adverse impact on direct investment of small domestic 
markets can be overcome through access to other markets, particular the largest 
developed markets in the US and Europe. Yet, access to these markets is uneven, with 
significant tariff and non-tariff barriers in many of the areas of most relevance to 
developing countries. 
 
Section II begins by examining the pattern of capital flows first to low-income 
countries, and then to emerging economies. In both cases, we see a dramatic collapse 
in the last several years. Section II goes on to analyse the evolving determinants of 
these trends in capital flows. It provides an assessment of FDI flows (the principal 
category of private flows to low-income countries) and goes on to assess other capital 
flows, focusing particularly on flows to emerging economies, which heavily influence 
both present and potential future flows to low-income countries. Section III examines 
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II  New pattern and sharp decline of private flows 
 
As shown by the World Bank data presented in Table 1, total private flows to low-
income countries collapsed after 1997. As the collapse in private flows was 
accompanied by only a small increase in official flows, total long-term net resource 
flows fell by half over the two years. Recently released figures show little signs of 
recovery in 2000, and the prospects for 2001-2 remain bleak. As discussed below, the 
pattern of private capital flows to emerging markets in recent years present an equally 
disturbing picture.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 7 
   
Table 1: Net long-term resource flows to low-income countries, 1990-2000 (1) 
                       
In millions of US dollars  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000
                       
Total  33,503 36,793 38,226 37,934 48,949 47,371 53,358 50,110 38,778  26,876 25,173
                        
Official flows  26,867 28,527 28,102 24,710 26,826 22,326 19,756 18,883 23,670  24,652 20,592
Long-term loans (2)  11,918 12,224 12,594 11,072 9,564 5,758 4,840 5,065 8,878  9,321 5,402
Grants (3)  14,949 16,304 15,509 13,639 17,263 16,567 14,916 13,818 14,792  15,332 15,191
                       
Private flows  6,636 8,266 10,124 13,224 22,122 25,045 33,603 31,227 15,108  2,223 4,581
Bank lending (4)  3,876 1,986 4,711 952 1,763 1,301 3,335 4,155 -3,765  -7,273 -7,296
Bond financing  142 1,734 -103 435 623 2,304 3,854 5,409 5,315  -2,841 2,787
Portfolio equity flows  416 33 499 4,564 10,727 7,617 8,846 2,671 649  2,616 2,528
Foreign direct investment (net)  2,201 4,514 5,016 7,273 9,008 13,824 17,569 18,993 12,910  9,721 6,562
                       
Memo item                       
Short-term debt  7,464 1,962 5,200 -6,035 27 9,286 8,894 2,116 -13,757  -901 -254
                       
Notes:  1. Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance 2002, database.         
  2. Includes "Net Flow of Long-Term Debt: Public & Publicly Guaranteed: Official Creditors"     
  3. Excludes technical assistance               
  4. Includes "Private Creditors (non-Bond)" and "Private Nonguaranteed (non-Bond)"       
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1.   An overview of private capital flows to low-income countries 
 
Private capital flows to low-income countries have fallen across the board, with 
massive withdrawals of bank lending and even bond finance and, strikingly, a sharp 
drop in FDI as well. This contrasts with the experience of emerging markets and 
middle income developing countries more generally, where the collapse has focused 
on bank lending and FDI has continued to rise, as discussed above. The reversal in 
long-term bank lending began in 1998 in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis. Following 
average net new lending of $4bn in 1996 and 1997, there were net repayments of 
$3.5bn in 1998 more than doubling to $7.7bn in 1999. As shown in Table 3, the total 
repayments of long-term loans in 1998 and 1999 exceeded the total cumulative net 
lending over the period 1994 to 1997. This sharp reversal was compounded by a 
massive withdrawal of short-term loans (see memo item in Table 3). The net 
withdrawal of short-term lending in 1998 reached $13.7bn – almost fully offsetting 
the net inflows of long-term capital from all sources that year. 
 
Bond finance to low-income countries also turned negative in 1999, following a string 
of large inflows in previous years. The downward trend in portfolio equity flows 
began earlier. Equity inflows dropped from an average of more than $9bn in 1994-96 
to less than $2bn in 1997-99. 
 
As briefly sketched out above, and as reflected in Table 2, and Graph 1, capital flows 
to emerging countries have suffered a major change since the East Asian crisis.  
According to IMF data from the October 2001 World Economic Outlook, net private 
capital flows to emerging market economies, which had peaked to almost $240 billion 
in 1996 (having grown consistently throughout the first half of the 1990's), more or 
less halved to around $120 billion in 1997, fell by around 40% to around $70 billion 
in 1998, fell a bit further in 1999 and collapsed to practically zero in 2000, and are 
projected by the IMF to be negative in 2001 (the most recent data for the latter is in 
the November 2001 IMF Emerging Market Quarterly). Emerging market current 
accounts have as a result also shifted dramatically, from significant deficits to very 
large surpluses, since 1999.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 9 
   
 
Table 2.  Emerging Market Economies: Net Capital Flows 
(billions of US dollars) 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
(1)  2002
(2) 
Total                     
Private capital flows, net    139.1  147.5    205.5    234.4   119.1     69.1      58.6         0.5      -1.4      71.0 
  Private direct  
  investment, net 
   57.6    81.4     97.5    120.0   145.8  155.9    153.1     147.3    162.7    158.2 
  Private portfolio  
  investment, net 
   87.6  112.8     43.8     87.8     48.1     -2.0      31.7        1.5      -0.2     24.0 
  Other private capital  
  flows, net 
(3) 
    -6.1  -46.8     64.2     26.7   -74.8   -84.9  -126.2  -148.3  -163.9  -111.2 
Official flows, net     50.3     5.5      24.1       0.1    62.2    55.4       9.5       1.4     19.6      -3.5 
















  39.1 
 
  128.1 
 
  69.6 
 






(3) Mainly net bank lending. Net bank lending is net lending minus v ariations of deposits in international banks and estimates; p projection                                      
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2001 
 
Source: IMF - Emerging Market Financing Quarterly. 14
th November 2001 
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As we will discuss in more detail below, there has also been an important change in 
the structure of private flows to emerging markets. These flows are now dominated by 
FDI (see again Table 2), which are the only significant source of supply of private 
capital to the total of emerging markets.  According to data in the IMF 2001 
International Capital Markets Report, this is particularly true for the Western 
Hemisphere and somewhat less the case for Asia, as in the latter net portfolio flows 
play a relatively large role (though smaller than FDI). 
 
Compared to the experience of emerging market countries, the most striking and 
disturbing feature of the recent trends in private capital flows to low-income countries 
has been the sharp fall in foreign direct investment inflows. After climbing every year 
in the 1990s to reach a peak of almost $20bn in 1997, FDI inflows fell by almost half 
to less than $10bn in 1999. These changes are examined in more detail in the section 
that follows on FDI flows. 
 
China has attracted around one-fifth of all private capital flows to developing 
countries in the 1990s. As shown in Table 4a, private flows to China increased 
strongly in the first half of the 1990s, peaking at $60bn in 1997, before falling back 
sharply to $42bn in 1998. The fall was due, in part, to a reversal in long-term bank 
lending, as net borrowing turned sharply negative in 1998 and 1999 (this was 
accompanied by a massive withdrawal of short-term bank lending, as shown in the 
memo item of Table 4). In addition, there was a collapse in bond finance and a sharp 
fall in equity investment. The impact of these declines was, however, limited by the 
dominance of FDI in total inflows. Indeed, FDI accounted for three-quarters of total 
net private inflows in the peak year 1998 and almost one-hundred percent in 1998 and 
1999.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 12 
   
Table 3a: Net long-term resource flows to China, 1990-1999 (1) 
                     
In millions of US dollars  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
Total  10,082  9,797  23,982  44,437  47,849  51,900  54,751  65,381  45,230  42,670 
                      
Official flows  1,975  2,286  2,683  4,887  3,457  8,231  4,652  4,552  2,554  2,038 
Long-term loans (2)  1,727  2,044  2,356  4,615  3,119  7,902  4,409  4,315  2,288  1,706 
Grants (3)  249  242  327  272  337  329  243  237  267  333 
                     
Private flows  8,107  7,512  21,299  39,550  44,393  43,669  50,099  60,828  42,675  40,632 
Bank lending (4)  4,668  2,469  8,952  5,979  3,814  4,696  5,264  4,805  -3,936  -2,514 
Bond financing  -48  24  -3  2,238  2,876  317  1,190  3,330  1,587  660 
Portfolio equity flows  0  653  1,194  3,818  3,915  2,807  3,466  8,457  1,273  3,732 
Foreign direct investment (net)  3,487  4,366  11,156  27,515  33,787  35,849  40,180  44,237  43,751  38,753 
                     
Memo item                     
Short-term debt flows (net)  2,410  1,463  2,985  1,531  2,187  4,843  3,082  6,057  -3,532  -10,251 
                     
Notes:  1. Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, database. 
  2. Includes "Net Flow of Long-Term Debt: Public & Publicly Guaranteed: Official Creditors" 
  3. Excludes technical assistance 
  4. Includes "Private Creditors (non-Bond)" and "Private Nonguaranteed (non-Bond)" 
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Table 3b: Net long-term resource flows to India, 1990-1999 
 
In millions of US dollars  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
Total  4719  5001  5242  7345  8755  4430  7486  6927  7629  3351 
                      
Official flows  2846  3460  3161  2321  1614  -490  809  146  1477  1538 
Long-term loans (2)  2334  2895  2581  1836  1002  -1048  220  -397  1001  1069 
Grants (3)  512  565  581  485  612  558  589  543  476  469 
                     
Private flows  1873  1541  2081  5024  7141  4920  6677  6781  6152  1813 
Bank lending (4)  1459  87  1769  2178  1475  973  35  -781  -946  -532 
Bond financing  147  1380  -206  456  -37  286  -182  1869  4121  -1125 
Portfolio equity flows  105  0  241  1840  4729  1517  4398  2116  342  1302 
Foreign direct investment (net)  162  74  277  550  973  2144  2426  3577  2635  2169 
                     
Memo item                     
Short-term debt flows (net)  1043  -1474  -730  -2714  638  785  1677  -1680  -717  -286 
                     
Notes:  1. Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, database. 
 2. Includes "Net Flow of Long-Term Debt: Public & Publicly Guaranteed: Official Creditors" 
 3. Excludes technical assistance   
 4. Includes "Private Creditors (non-Bond)" and "Private Nonguaranteed (non-Bond)" 
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Private inflows to India were, by contrast, stable in 1998, but then fell very sharply in 
1999. As shown in Table 3b, FDI flows fell back somewhat in 1998-99 from their 
peak in 1997. While private flows to India proved resistant to the immediate fall out 
of the Asian crisis, the sharp contraction of the flow of international bond finance to 
developing countries that occurred in 1999 did have an effect, as India experienced a 
sharp reversal of bond financing leading to a drop in private inflows overall. 
 
2.  Foreign direct investment 
 
Foreign direct investment is the dominant form of private capital flow to developing 
countries, accounting for about 70 percent of private flows to developing countries as 
a whole and a significantly higher percentage of private flows to low-income 
countries. It is therefore particularly important to understand how these flows have 
evolved in recent years. The data analysed in the first part of this section were 
provided by UNCTAD, from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2001. 
 
It is important to emphasise, as discussed above, that these data do not fully capture 
the flows of direct investment experienced by developing countries. As discussed in 
Annex 1, Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin (1999) show that direct 
investment flows are exceedingly difficult to monitor due to the problems of 
measuring and identifying flows through institutions such as bureaux de change and 
even banks. Although it is impossible to identify the scale of the under- or mis-
recording with any degree of precision, case studies suggest that the underreporting of 
direct investment flows can easily amount to several percentage points of GDP. Thus, 
while the UNCTAD data on FDI remain the most reliable source of data for 
international comparisons and analysis, they, like the World Bank data, must be used 
with caution. 
 
The surge in foreign direct investment – and in private capital flows generally – in the 
1990s is well-documented, as is the even greater surge in direct investment into 
developing countries. While the analysis below focuses on normalised levels of these 
flows as percentages of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and of GDP, it is useful 
first to examine the changes over time in the levels of direct investment flows and 
how these have been distributed across countries. Since both GFCF and GDP are 
relatively stable over time, it is by direct examination of the changing levels of FDI in 
low-income countries that we obtain the clearest picture of the trends and patterns in 
these flows. 
 
As shown in Table 4, annual inflows of direct investment into developing countries in 
the 1990s averaged $108bn (compared to $16bn in the 1980s). Indeed, the level of 
direct investment to developing countries increased every year in the 1990s, reaching 
$194bn in 1999. 
 
An examination of the share of worldwide direct investment flows going to 
developing countries reveals a somewhat different picture, especially in the most 
recent period. UNCTAD data show that developing countries’ share of world direct 
investment flows averaged 27 percent in the 1990s (compared to 17 percent in the 
1980s), peaking at 37 percent in 1997. This rise reflected, in part, the gathering pace 
of privatisation programmes in developing countries. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 15 
   
 
Since 1997, however, the share has dropped by more than half, reaching 14 percent in 
2000. The declining developing country share is, in part, the result of the global 
mergers and acquisitions boom in 1998-2000, in which developing countries played 
only a very minor role. But the effects of the Asian crisis and of the LTCM-Russian 
crisis, and their aftermath, are also evident: apart from a short-lived increase in 1999, 
FDI flows to developing countries have not increased since 1997 while flows to 
developed countries have almost quadrupled. 
 
Much of the increase in direct investment flows to developing countries in the 1990s 
was the result of a sharp rise in the investments flowing to a handful of the largest 
economies. The major emerging market countries together accounted for about two-
thirds of the $93bn rise in average flows to developing countries between the 1980s 
and 1990s, with China alone accounting for $27bn of the rise. China’s share of total 
FDI flows to developing countries peaked at 38 percent in 1993, before falling to less 
than a quarter in recent years. 
 
Direct investment flows to the major emerging markets have also proved robust to the 
downturn in flows to other developing countries since the Asian crisis as discussed 
below. Flows have risen strongly over the period, from $86bn in 1996 to $126bn in 
2000. Much of the increase has gone to the major Latin American economies, 
together with Taiwan and, especially, Korea, with flows to China and India remaining 
flat over the past five years.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 16 
   
Table 4: Inflows of foreign direct investment, 1990 – 2000 








1990-99  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
                           
World  93836  396624  202297  155583  168501  221855  256518  331068  384910  477918  692544  1075049  1270764 
                           
Developing countries  15749  108252  26491  36546  52587  72335  91682  110228  133404  174367  174862  193606  175593 
   as % of world  17%  27%  13%  23%  31%  33%  36%  33%  35%  36%  25%  18%  14% 
                           
Major emerging markets  8333  69414  15398  21230  34000  47971  61740  71896  85622  112461  106335  132547  126166 
   as % of dev'g countries  53%  64%  58%  58%  65%  66%  67%  65%  64%  64%  61%  68%  72% 
   China  1508  28465  3487  4366  11156  27515  33787  35849  40180  44237  43751  40319  40772 
                           
Sub-Saharan Africa  1288  4514  1285  2413  2104  2287  3714  4724  5221  8704  6341  8310  6846 
   as % of dev'g countries  8.2%  4.2%  4.9%  6.6%  4.0%  3.2%  4.1%  4.3%  3.9%  5.0%  3.6%  4.3%  3.9% 
   Angola  134  574  -335  665  288  302  170  472  181  412  1114  2471  1800 
   Nigeria  434  1177  588  712  897  1345  1959  1079  1593  1539  1051  1005  1000 
   South Africa  21  850  -78  248  4  10  380  1241  818  3817  561  1502  877 
                           
South Asia  260  2259  545  408  758  1118  1586  2945  3686  4935  3541  3063  3036 
   as % of dev'g countries  1.7%  2.1%  2.1%  1.1%  1.4%  1.5%  1.7%  2.7%  2.8%  2.8%  2.0%  1.6%  1.7% 
   India  105  1523  236  74  277  550  973  2144  2591  3613  2614  2154  2315 
                           
Source:  Data supplied by UNCTAD, from forthcoming Handbook of Statistics, 2001. 
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The robustness of direct investment flows to the major emerging markets since the 
Asian crisis has not, however, been shared by the low-income developing countries. 
As shown in Table 1, FDI flows to low-income countries in 2000 were only a third of 
the 1997 levels. 
 
An analysis of flows to Sub-Saharan Africa and to South Asia confirms this 
downward trend among low-income countries. As shown in Table 5, FDI flows to 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole have been volatile in the late 1990s. Virtually all of 
this volatility has, however, been due to just two countries: South Africa and Angola. 
Excluding those countries and Nigeria, FDI inflows to the region have declined since 
1998, although less sharply than for low-income countries as a whole (see Leape, 
2002, for a more detailed analysis of capital flows to Africa). 
  
FDI flows to South Asia have dropped more sharply since 1997, with falls in all 
countries (see Table 4). After increasing almost 1500 percent between 1990 and 1997, 
direct investment flows to India have fallen back 40 percent in the last three years. 
Flows to the rest of the region have decreased by 30 percent over the same period.  
 
If, however, we examine the magnitude of FDI flows in terms of recipient country 
GDP and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), a different picture emerges. Annual 
FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa, according to the UNCTAD data shown in Table 
5, averaged just over three percent of GDP in the 1990s – on a par with flows to 
developing countries as a whole and substantially higher than the figures for the major 
emerging markets (two percent of GDP) or for developed countries (1.2 percent). As a 
share of gross fixed capital formation, FDI flows to Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 11 
percent in the 1990s, more than double the percentage for developed countries 
(excluding the high M&A-driven figures at the end of the 1990s). These figures 
appear inconsistent with the high levels of risk in low-income countries, especially in 
Africa – a theme that is explored in more depth in section III. 
 
The apparent inconsistency is, in part, a reflection of the low levels of fixed 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. More important, however, is the different 
composition of direct investment in Africa compared to other regions. Leape (2002) 
shows that almost exactly half of the stock of US direct investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2000 was petroleum-related. Moreover, this percentage has increased from 
only a third in 1990, indicating that a substantial fraction of new direct investment 
into Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s was in the petroleum sector. This contrasts with 
the diversification of FDI flows to poor countries generally during the 1990s, where 
the share of the mineral- and oil-exporting countries in total FDI to the poor countries 
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Table 5: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP and of Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
           
 
FDI as % of GDP    FDI as % of GFCF 








           
World  0.7  1.4    3.2  6.6 
           
Developing countries  1.3  3.2    6.0  12.8 
           
Major emerging markets  0.7  2.0    2.9  7.5 
   China  0.5  4.1    1.5  11.2 
           
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.3  3.1    7.3  10.9 
   Angola  2.2  10.1    19.3  55.6 
   Nigeria  1.4  3.9    14.1  26.1 
   South Africa  0.0  0.7    0.0  3.7 
           
South Asia  0.4  1.0    1.1  3.8 
   India  0.0  0.4    0.2  0.4 
           
Source:  Data supplied by UNCTAD, from forthcoming Handbook of Statistics, 2001. 
 
The countries of South Asia have experienced lower levels of foreign direct 
investment than other developing countries, whether we look at FDI inflows as a 
fraction of GDP or of GFCF. FDI inflows averaged just one percent of GDP in the 
1990s – less than one-third the level in developing countries as a whole (see Table 5). 
A similar picture emerges from a comparison of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital 
formation, where the share averaged less than four percent. Indeed, over the 1990s, 
FDI inflows into developing countries (and to Sub-Saharan Africa) more than doubled 
as a percentage of GDP – but rose by less than 25 percent in South Asia. The same 
picture emerges in even starker form as regards FDI flows into India. Measured as a 
fraction of GDP, FDI flows to India in the 1990s averaged only 0.4 percent – one-
eighth the average for developing countries generally. As a fraction of GFCF, FDI 
was even less important, at less than a twentieth the average developing country level. 
 
FDI flows to China present a very different picture. From insignificant levels in the 
1980s, direct investment into China surged in the first half of the 1990s. As shown in 
Table 6, FDI to China as a share of GDP was twice the average for the major 
emerging markets, and well above the average for developing countries. Foreign 
direct investment into China accounted for more than a tenth of average gross fixed 
capital formation in the 1990s, again exceeding the average for emerging markets by a 
significant margin. 
 
  Policy reforms and direct investment flows 
 
The potential for sharply increasing FDI flows to low-income countries through 
policy reforms has been illustrated by the experience of Bangladesh in the 1990s. 
Bangladesh removed several restrictions on foreign investors – including prior 
approval requirements and restrictions on profit repatriation and on equity stakes – in QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 19 
   
the early 1990s.
1 FDI inflows then increased more than tenfold in 1997 (from $13mn 
in 1996 to $141mn in 1997) and continued at the new higher levels in 1998 and 1999. 
Although the energy sector has been the major recipient of these flows, manufacturing 
and service industries have received almost one-third of the new inflows. It is, 
however, important to note that FDI flows to Bangladesh remain very small relative to 
the size of the economy, at less than one-half of one percent of GDP at their peak in 
1998. 
 
While liberalisation of restrictions on investors is clearly essential to attracting 
investment, they are far from sufficient. Numerous studies have identified unstable 
political and economic environments as a key impediment to long-term investment 
(see, for example, Hess, 2000, for a discussion of the issue in Southern Africa). Such 
instability creates problems of imperfect information, as investors face greater 
uncertainty in their expectations of future prices and future policies. Instability also 
leads to missing markets, as the resulting range of possible contingencies inhibits 
firms from entering into long-term contracts. 
 
Many sources of economic and political instability are, however, amenable to action 
by governments and societies. Resolution of long-standing political conflicts can yield 
dramatic benefits. So, too, can macroeconomic stabilisation and greater policy 
consistency. The transformation in Mozambique, for example, has been associated 
with a six-fold rise in inward direct investment, compared to a rise of less than 
threefold for developing countries generally. The political and economic stabilisation 
in Uganda led to a similar rise in direct investment inflows over the same period, 
while that in Tanzania has been associated with a tenfold increase. Equally dramatic 
was the impact of the democratic transition in South Africa, which was associated 
with an even larger proportionate increase in direct investment inflows over the 
period, albeit from a particularly low base in the early 1990s. 
 
Table 6a,b,c provides further evidence of the importance of sound policy in attracting 
foreign direct investment. Table 6a show the net long-term resource flows to severely-
indebted low-income countries, excluding the “original” and “enhanced” HIPC 
countries. Here the trends identified above for low-income countries as a whole 
(Table 2) come out even more strongly. Not only did private flows to these severely-
indebted low-income countries collapse in 1998 (falling to a negligible £590mn from 
$16bn the previous year and $20bn in 1996), but they then turned strongly negative in 
1999, with a net outflow of $4.4bn in private capital. 
 
An examination of the composition of inflows shows a staggering withdrawal of long-
term banking lending, with outflows in 1998-99 equal to some four-fifths of total 
cumulative inflows in the previous eight years. This outflow of long-term bank 
lending was accompanied by an equally dramatic outflow of short-term bank lending, 
an outflow of bond finance and a collapse in portfolio equity. Most surprisingly – and 
in contrast with the experience of emerging markets, as noted above - the data show a 
collapse in FDI inflows, with a drop of almost 80 percent between 1996 and 1999.  
Indeed, the reversal of private capital flows to these countries has been so dramatic 
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that more than half of all official assistance to these countries in 1999 was absorbed 
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Table 6a: Net long-term resource flows to severely-indebted low-income countries (excluding HIPC countries),    
1990-1999 
                     
In millions of US dollars  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
Total  12707  15535  15542  13727  20371  21889  24762  21638  7908  3663 
                      
Official flows  8557  10254  9545  8659  8689  6903  4819  5617  7319  8054 
Long-term loans (2)  4600  5470  5161  4380  3943  2570  481  1421  3527  4143 
Grants (3)  3957  4784  4384  4279  4746  4333  4337  4196  3791  3911 
                     
Private flows  4150  5282  5998  5068  11682  14986  19943  16021  590  -4391 
Bank lending (4)  2009  1486  2117  -1766  1011  -43  2770  3869  -2889  -6218 
Bond financing  26  381  155  8  690  2248  3894  3494  -141  -1533 
Portfolio equity flows  312  23  258  2637  5053  5624  3814  552  252  1274 
Foreign direct investment (net)  1803  3391  3467  4188  4928  7158  9465  8107  3368  2086 
                     
Memo item                     
Short-term debt flows (net)  4255  4017  4952  -2548  867  7646  5006  681  -9866  -1609 
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Table 6b: Net long-term resource flows to original HIPC countries, 1990-1999 
                     
In millions of US dollars  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
Total  3340  3677  3246  3269  4113  4487  4227  3928  4578  3942 
                     
Official flows  3254  3657  3267  2948  3688  3459  2923  2723  2844  2186 
Long-term loans (2)  1325  1108  1300  1203  1302  1040  779  649  548  166 
Grants (3)  1929  2550  1967  1745  2387  2420  2144  2075  2296  2020 
                     
Private flows  86  20  -21  321  425  1028  1304  1205  1734  1757 
Bank lending (4)  11  -86  -50  -65  -55  59  142  -226  -139  -254 
Bond financing  -2  0  0  0  0  0  0  -3  -23  -46 
Portfolio equity flows  0  0  0  0  7  3  30  18  6  8 
Foreign direct investment (net)  77  106  29  385  473  966  1131  1416  1889  2049 
                     
Memo item                     
Short-term debt flows (net)  744  155  372  394  -1529  709  2040  1402  -238  8 
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Table 6c: Net long-term resource flows to enhanced HIPC countries, 1990-1999 
                     
In millions of US dollars  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
Total  6418  5808  6277  5018  5194  4708  4775  5514  4941  5398 
                     
Official flows  6189  5779  6069  4780  5058  4495  4151  4593  4038  4185 
Long-term loans (2)  2251  1378  2246  1599  1435  937  915  1909  782  971 
Grants (3)  3938  4401  3824  3181  3623  3558  3237  2684  3255  3214 
                     
Private flows  229  29  208  238  136  213  624  921  904  1213 
Bank lending (4)  -12  -129  -75  -58  -130  -221  -2  -60  -20  -9 
Bond financing  0  0  0  152  0  -13  -21  -30  -32  0 
Portfolio equity flows  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  24  0 
Foreign direct investment (net)  241  158  283  144  267  448  646  1011  931  1223 
                     
Memo item                     
Short-term debt  302  -515  -156  -212  -51  213  -28  826  -80  38 
                     
                     
Notes:  1. Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, database. 
 2. Includes "Net Flow of Long-Term Debt: Public & Publicly Guaranteed: Official Creditors" 
 3. Excludes technical assistance 
 4. Includes "Private Creditors (non-Bond)" and "Private Nonguaranteed (non-Bond)" 
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By contrast, Tables 6b and 6c show that the HIPC countries – both those in the 
“original” group and those in the “enhanced” group – experienced sharp increases in 
FDI inflows in recent years, which in both cases almost doubled between 1996 and 
1999. These increases resulted in a steady rise in private capital inflows over the 
period, despite the small withdrawals of bank lending that occurred. 
 
The contrasting experiences of the HIPC countries and the non-HIPC severely-
indebted low-income countries appears to provide evidence of the success of HIPC in 
attracting new private capital flows. On closer examination, however, the role of 
HIPC in stimulating the increasing flows is less clear. In the first instance, private 
capital flows, especially debt flows,  to the original and enhanced HIPC countries in 
the first half of the 1990s were negligible – in contrast to the significant lending that 
took place to the non-HIPC severely-indebted low-income countries, with the result 
that there was simply less private capital to be withdrawn when the Asian crisis 
struck. Indeed, relative to previous debt inflows, the reversal of debt flows to the 
original HIPC countries was, if anything, greater in magnitude than the reversal 
experienced by the non-HIPC countries. 
 
More importantly, the “outperformance” in direct investment flows to the original and 
enhanced HIPC countries – compared to the non-HIPC severely-indebted low-income 
countries – dates from 1997, which is before the impact of or even eligibility for 
HIPC (especially in the case of the “enhanced” countries) would have been 
anticipated by potential investors. It seems likely that HIPC status has conferred 
additional credibility on the economic reforms undertaken by the participating 
countries. However, on the basis of these data, one cannot reject they hypothesis that 
it is the good policy environment – for which HIPC was a reward – that has been 
more important in attracting increasing private capital inflows. 
 
It is worth noting that the costs of instability can be just as great as the benefits of 
stabilisation, and tend to be felt more quickly. The current turmoil in Zimbabwe has 
led to a collapse in investment inflows, from a peak of $444mn in 1998 to $30mn in 
2000.  
 
The only significant exception to this pattern is natural resource-driven investment 
flows, which have proved relatively robust to political and economic instability. 
Angola, for example, has continued to attract substantial oil-related investments, 
despite the civil war. It is important to recognise that natural resource-driven 
investments differ from other investments in important ways. The output is destined 
for world markets, and wholly independent of the domestic market. The returns are 
therefore typically in hard currency and often kept offshore in escrow accounts. The 
investments are carried out in enclaves where it is feasible for the investor to provide 
any needed infrastructure and protection. And the level of returns is generally high 
enough to enable the investor to buy the necessary political support from rent-seeking 
factions and politicians. For all of these reasons, mineral- and oil-related investment is 
relatively robust to the types of risk that would typically discourage investment in 
other sectors.  This, in turn, helps to explain the relatively high level of FDI to Sub-
Saharan Africa, especially relative to GDP and GFCF, in the face of the array of risks 
discussed more fully in section III below. 
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By contrast, investments aimed, at least in part, at producing for the domestic market; 
investments in the manufacturing and service sectors; investments aimed at building 
linkages with small and medium-sized enterprises – all of these depend critically on 
economic and political stability. Efforts to increase long-term investment into low-
income countries must therefore pay close attention to this issue. 
 
The foregoing examination of FDI inflows has revealed a degree of diversity among 
low-income countries. While the role of mineral and oil-related investments has been 
discussed in explaining the relatively high level of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
low level of FDI in the poor countries of South Asia remains noteworthy. Against this 
background, it is striking that the countries of South Asia have, in recent years, 
achieved average growth rates twice as high as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. While an 
examination of the reasons for this divergent growth experience goes far beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is worth noting that this underscores the crucial importance of 
the productivity of investment. 
 
More importantly, the data presented above demonstrate that private capital flows to 
low-income countries have collapsed since 1997, as debt outflows have been 
compounded by steep declines in FDI. 
 
These declines are particularly disturbing in light of the view expressed by market 
participants that FDI is the most attractive vehicle for investment in low-income 
countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, one senior market participant 
said: “FDI may be the only likely future flow to low-income countries.”
2  An 
explanation given by another market participant of why investors should prefer to go 
into low-income countries via FDI rather than via portfolio investment is that the 
former allows them more control which they see as particularly important, given that 
according to their perception, there is insufficient rule of law, imperfections in 
corporate governance and, especially, insufficient protection of minority investors. In 
this light, if the recent declines in FDI to low-income countries persist, they may 
herald a sharp reduction in the flow of private capital generally. 
  
The sharp falls in direct investment to low-income countries add a new urgency to the 
question of how the demand for long-term assets in low-income countries can be 
increased. Part of the answer appears to lie in addressing a set of issues relating to 
developed country investors. Another part of the answer seems, as illustrated by the 
above review of several “success stories” from Africa, to lie in policy reforms – and, 
in particular, sustained efforts to achieve political and economic stabilisation – in the 
recipient countries. A detailed consideration of these issues – relating to developed-
country investors and to recipient country policies – is presented in Section III below. 
 
Before proceeding to those issues, however, we turn to an examination of the 
experience of emerging markets during the recent downturn in capital flows. As noted 
earlier, emerging market experience is highly relevant to that of low-income 
countries. In the first instance, the more developed and more liquid emerging country 
markets typically provide the first indications of shocks that will later affect 
developing countries more generally. More importantly, the emerging markets also 
                                                                 
2 Interview material QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 26 
   
provide insights into the issues likely to face low-income countries as their capital 
markets, and their economies more generally, continue to develop. 
 
In contrast to the pattern identified above in low-income countries, FDI to emerging 
markets has, in recent years, played a stabilising role, partly offsetting outflows of 
debt finance. However, FDI flows are increasingly hedged. 
 
Within emerging markets, there has been not just a drastic fall in but also a dramatic 
change in the structure of flows. FDI to emerging markets, which had tripled since the 
early 1990's to peak at $155 billion in 1998, remained constant at that high level.  It is 
since 1998 also the only significantly high source of foreign capital inflow for 
emerging markets. This change in the structure of flows, with far greater importance 
for FDI, is overall a very positive development. 
 
Important caveats are necessary even for FDI. The first one is that there is a risk that 
FDI even to emerging markets may not be sustained at its' current high levels. This is 
both because of changes in the developed economies and because the "easy phase," of 
FDI purchasing companies that are being privatised or buying large attractive 
companies already in the private sector, may gradually come to a close. In successful 
dynamic economies or sectors, this phase may be followed by additional FDI to take 
account of profitable opportunities of expansion (e.g. as occurred in telecoms in 
several Latin American countries), or greenfield investment.  However, in less 
dynamic economies or sectors, FDI may just decline in a second phase. (See recent 
Report on FDI by ECLAC, 2002) 
 
The second caveat has been explored less in the literature, but it has in fact become a 
major new issue.
3 It relates to the fact that multinational companies, especially those 
producing for the domestic market, can hedge the foreign exchange risk, either for 
their profit remittances or even up to the level of their capital. This may reduce the 
positive net foreign exchange impact of the FDI; this may be done for example, by 
purchasing US $ or US $ denominated government paper in the country (e.g. Brazil, 
Mexico), or by hedging off-shore.  It is particularly problematic if companies 
dramatically increase their hedging of exchange rate risk, at a time when a 
devaluation becomes likely; as there may be no-one willing to "take the other side", 
this may lead to an outflow of foreign exchange, and thus put pressure on the 
exchange rate. Though the intention is to hedge and not to speculate, the impact on 
reserves and the exchange rate may be the same.  Reportedly, this trend has been a 
major one in recent years, especially in Latin America and has contributed to 
significantly deepen pressures on devaluation. A source of concern is that such 
hedging takes place both with fixed and floating exchange rate regimes.  
 
The mechanisms through which such hedging by foreign direct investors takes place 
can be problematic in several ways (see Dodd, 2001). A common instrument for such 
hedging are foreign exchange forwards and swaps. Such transactions involve both a 
short and long position. Ideally, a dealer in such transactions faces markets with 
participants willing to buy and sell in equal amounts. However, often in developing 
countries (for example, when expectations of devaluation increase), dealers in such 
foreign exchange derivatives face a one-sided or imbalanced market in which most 
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participants wish to be short the local currency. This may make it difficult or 
expensive for dealers to lay-off their long positions by selling short to others in the 
derivatives markets.  As a result, either the forward exchange rate must deteriorate 
sufficiently to compensate the dealer and other risk takers for holding greater amounts 
of the long positions or s/he must find other means to manage risk.  
 
One such method used in imbalanced markets is for dealers to create a synthetic short 
forward or swap contract through the use of the local and foreign credit markets. To 
do this, the dealer borrows in the local currency credit market, uses the loan to buy 
foreign currency spot and then lends it abroad, ideally matching the maturity for all 
three transactions.  In the process of creating the synthetic short forward position in 
order to make a market in foreign exchange derivatives, the dealer has generated a 
capital outflow by borrowing at home and lending abroad. Thus, in the context of 
imbalanced markets, with more participants willing to hold short, rather than long 
positions at certain rates, hedging can generate capital outflows. Thus, should the 
foreign direct investor hedge the full value of the invested principal, then the hedging 
process can temporarily neutralise or net-out the capital inflow. 
 
3.  Bank lending:  water flows upwards 
In sharp contrast to FDI, whose levels has remained high since the East Asian crises, 
net international bank lending to developing countries has not only collapsed but 
become highly negative during the 1997- 2001 period (see Table 7) as well as 
previous Tables. (See also BIS Quarterly Review, June 2002, which shows continued 





Table 7:  International banks' involvement with developing countries 
 
            June 1998  Dec 2000  %change 
          (US $ BN)  (US $ BN)  (at annual rate) 
All developing countries 
 
Loans outstanding        924    739    - 8.8 
 
Other assets*          110    155    14.7 
 
Loans by subsidiaries in local 
currency          248    435    25.2 
 
 
*Includes holding of debt securities, some derivative positions and equities. 
 
Source: Hawkins (2001) and BIS data 
 
 
The decline was across the board as relates to all developing country regions, but far 
deeper in crisis-hit East Asian economies. As shown in Table 1 above, low-income 
countries suffered a particularly dramatic reversal of bank lending. The main reason is 
banks' greater perception of the risks of lending to developing countries, especially to 
Asia. The main reason for the increased perception of  - and aversion to - risk in 
international lending for developing countries comes from the frequency and large 
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dangerous for both lenders and borrowers, given recent experience in crises. A 
secondary reason is that (once recession or lower growth hit countries), their demand 
for international loans fell. Another reason for the decline in international bank 
lending seems to be lower demand for international financing, as sovereigns and 
companies in emerging markets see domestic financing as safer. 
 
As Kumar and Persaud (2001) argue persuasively for investors, it seems also to be 
true for bank lenders that at any point in time their appetite for risk is in one of two 
states: risk loving or risk averse. As emphasised in our introduction, this leads to an 
endogeneity of risk in low-income and developing countries, stemming from the 
decisions of developed country investors and lenders. Recent experience, and 
particularly the losses made in Russia and on developing country corporates
4 
(especially in the East Asian crises countries), has contributed to bankers' aversion to 
developing country risk. This is occurring in a context where banks have become 
more generally risk sensitive and therefore more reluctant to assume risk.  This is 
related to greater emphasis on shareholder value, which forces banks to reassess the 
balance of their activities against the criterion of rate of return, and not the volume of 
business. This pressure on shareholder value is being further encouraged by the 
growing importance of, and competition from, capital markets.  Increasingly banks 
behave more like portfolio investors, and use similar instruments such as credit risk 
derivatives.  Furthermore, an increasing trend amongst banks to use VAR models not 
only increase risk sensitivity but also according to some analysts, contribute to 
herding and pro-cyclicality.  
 
A second, positive major change is that the average maturity of bank loans has 
increased. Thus, for all developing countries, the ratio of short-term to total debt fell 
from 54% in 1996 to 46.5% in 2000; the decline was particularly sharp for East Asia 
and the Pacific, where according to Work Bank data, it fell during the period from 
1996 to 2000. One reason for this change is that borrowers have, as a result of the 
painful experiences of sudden loss of bank credit during recent crises, become 
reluctant to depend excessively on short term loans. Indeed, reportedly
5 several 
countries have adopted specific guidelines aimed at restricting short-term borrowing 
by banks and lengthening debt maturities.  Some banks interviewed, argued that they 
would like to increase their short-term exposure, especially to large banks (which they 
consider safe), but there is insufficient country demand.  
 
In the case of low-income countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, banks have 
traditionally concentrated on short term lending, typically related to trade finance, and 
have - on the whole - avoided medium term international bank lending.  Their 
reluctance to make such medium term loans to poor countries has increased, even if 
the country itself has improved its fundamental and structural features.  However, 
some banks expressed interest in making small loans to SSA low-income countries, 
particularly if these are related to the payment business or if there is a package, which 
involves World Bank/export credit agencies loans or guarantees, and where the 
private bank lends a fairly small proportion, e.g. 25%. Banks continue to lend to 
creditworthy low-income countries like India and China.  
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A third major recent change (see again Table 2), related to the previous ones, is that 
international banks have been significantly increasing lending via domestic 
subsidiaries in local currency.  This is made possible by the dramatic increase in 
foreign ownership by international banks of bank subsidiaries in developing countries, 
that is, banks “crossing the border.”
6  Greater foreign ownership of banks is partly 
also a result of recent crises; these crises have significantly reduced the entry costs for 
foreign banks, not only through currency devaluations, but because crises led to an 
erosion of net worth of banks.
7 From the perspective of international banks, lending 
through subsidiaries has the advantage of allowing better quality control from lending 
officers located in specific emerging economies.  However, the main advantages for 
the bank is avoiding a currency mismatch, and thus exchange rate risk. 
 
These loans are funded locally via deposits in domestic currency.  Though some 
bankers argue that local currency lending by foreign subsidiaries could potentially be 
complementary to international bank lending,
8 recent trends suggest the opposite, that 
is a substitution effect. Indeed, several bankers argue that there is a large 
redistribution of banks' overall emerging markets portfolios, in which banks have 
substituted onshore for offshore lending.  From the perspective of developing 
countries, this may have some advantages, e.g. of stronger and more efficient banks, 
as well as some smaller vulnerability to crises.  For example, in a recent study of 
private capital flows to Africa, Leape (1999) argues that the presence of foreign-
owned banks can facilitate the transfer of skills in risk management and credit 
analysis and of good regulatory practice, and increase the quality of loans, as 
increased competition improves credit decisions and reduces margins. All of these 




However, “crossing the border” also has costs and other disadvantages. The cost, 
which can be very significant, is a smaller capital inflow to the developing country 
(with a one-off purchase via FDI of banks replacing a far larger stream of 
international bank lending). The potential disadvantages are that domestic lending by 
international bank subsidiaries may have certain biases not suited for developing 
countries.  For example, in comparison with the domestic banks which they have 
replaced by purchasing them, they may be more focussed on lending mainly to large 
companies, and less oriented to lending to SMEs, which generate a high proportion of 
employment in developing countries.  Furthermore, they may attach more priority to 
consumer lending (e.g. credit cards), especially to middle and high-income persons, 
and less priority to lending to companies, especially for long term investment. Given 
the need in development countries for higher and more efficient investment, this may 
be very problematic.
10  Indeed, Leape (1999) finds that foreign banks in Africa have 
tended to focus primarily on profitable niche markets in high value consumer and 
corporate business, thereby undermining the profitability of the indigenous banking 
sector. In addition, experience in Africa has shown that foreign banks can also 
increase the vulnerability to crisis – as happened when the collapse of BCCI and of 
Meridian Banks triggered broader crises of confidence in the financial sectors in 
                                                                 
6 Lubin, 2001 
7 Lubin, op. cit. 
8 Interview material 
9 Leape (1999), pp. 145-6 
10 We thank Ricardo Ffrench-Davis for this point QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 30 
   
several countries.
11 The effects on development in different categories of developing 
countries, of these new trends - increased bank foreign ownership, and of bank 
lending “crossing the border” - needs further careful empirical research. 
 
While “crossing the border” has thus been an important factor in Africa, the same has 
not been true in China and India, where foreign ownership in the financial sector 
continues to be subject to stringent controls. In both cases, the incentives to liberalise 
foreign ownership have been much weaker. In addition to the historical resistance in 
both countries to foreign ownership, it is likely that the absence of regional integration 
as a policy objective and the relative lack of vulnerability to financial crisis have also 
played a role. Looking forward, however, it is likely that the incentives to facilitate 
foreign ownership in the financial sector will increase over time, and “crossing the 
border” may well become an important phenomenon in the coming years. A question 
that will then arise is to what extent the availability of domestic finance from 
international banks will slow the pace not only of international bank lending but also 
of foreign direct investment flows into China.
12 
 
There is another somewhat related change, which is banks' increase in fee-based 
activities (such as supporting bond issuance), which reflects banks aspirations for high 
returns, without adding assets to their balance sheet (which require more capital); it 
also reflects greater unwillingness to taking risks on their own balance sheets. 
 
To conclude, the major reversal of  international bank lending in the years following 
the Asian crisis  clearly has a temporary element, largely linked to the memory of 
recent crises and reinforced more recently by the slowdown in the world economy and 
its' negative effects on developing countries' prospects.  If crises stop occurring, the 
memory of them fades and the world economy recovers, this temporary element could 
be reversed.  
 
However, more structural - and therefore more permanent - elements seem to play a 
significant role in the decline of international bank lending to developing countries.  
The main one seems to be increased ownership by international banks of subsidiaries 
in developing countries, which allows them to "cross the border" in their lending, with 
loans in local currency.  Though such local currency lending could be complemented 
by international lending, there may be a strong incentive for banks not to do so on a 
significant scale, especially given increasing emphasis on risk sensitivity and the 
relatively high level of exchange rate risk in international lending to developing 
countries. 
 
4.  Portfolio Flows 
 
a.  Equity Flows 
Portfolio equity flows to developing countries, which had grown significantly 
between 1990-1997, fell after the East Asian crisis, though the decline was far less 
dramatic than that of bank lending; flows then grew briefly especially to Asia, before 
starting to fall again;
13 furthermore, equity flows have become increasingly 
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concentrated in very few developing countries, practically all of which are middle-
income. Thus, in 2000, according to the World Bank Global Development Finance 
2001, just four countries - Brazil, China, Mexico and Turkey - accounted for around 
85% of all equity flows to developing countries. Of these four, only one, China, is 
low-income. Furthermore, the volatility of equity flows remains an issue. As the 
World Bank, points out, in three of the recent crises - Mexico, East Asia and Russia, 
mutual funds (which represent some of the most significant equity investors in 
emerging markets) withdrew large sums of money.
14   
 
Recent trends in portfolio equity flows to developing countries are in sharp contrast 
with global cross-border equity portfolio flows which have increased dramatically; 
indeed, according to Persaud (2001), those have risen fivefold from $268 billion in 
1995 to an estimated $1.100 billion in 2000.  Thus developing countries have a far 
lower percentage of global equity flows than in the mid 1990's.  
 
The process of allocation of investors' funds to invest in equity - globally and in 
developing countries - is quite complex, particularly as it involves different actors. 
We will very briefly outline it here, as this helps analyse recent changes.  Institutional 
investors - such as pension funds and insurance companies - as well as retail investors 
(wealthy individuals) and charities, are major actors in investment globally.  In the 
case of pension funds, the ultimate responsibility for allocating funds falls on their 
trustees.  However, particularly in the US and the UK, trustees rely on the advice of 
consultants, who advise on how - given the structure of their liabilities - they should 
broadly allocate their assets. Once the broad allocative decisions are taken, one or 
several fund managers are chosen. These fund managers may have global, regional or 
country mandates; they may specialise in bonds and/or equities. In the case of 
investment in developing countries, these may be a small part of a global fund, they 
may take the form of specialised funds for all emerging markets, they may be regional 
ones (e.g. for Latin America, for the Far East, Sub-Saharan Africa or Eastern Europe), 
or there may even be country funds. 
 
One of the more important trends detected,
15 is that since the mid 1990's there has 
been a sharp reduction of so called dedicated investors: this refers both to emerging 
market country funds, which have practically disappeared, and a decline in regional 
emerging market funds.  This latter trend seems particularly clear for Sub-Saharan 
Africa funds.  A far higher proportion of equity flows going to emerging markets 
therefore is via so called "cross-over investors," that is those originating from global 
funds, where a very small proportion of their portfolios goes to emerging markets.  
This trend is problematic, because dedicated investors tend to have a more long-term 




As regards an explanation of the evolution of equity flows to developing countries; 
the nineties was described by one fund manager
17 as "a history of two halves."  In the 
first half of the nineties, there was great optimism about the prospect for emerging 
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markets, with the expectation that higher returns would compensate for higher risks, 
and with the perception that emerging markets offered an interesting opportunity for 
portfolio diversification due to their low correlation with developed economies.  As a 
result equity flows to EMs grew systematically.  
 
The optimism even extended to Sub-Saharan Africa, which was called then "the last 
frontier of emerging markets."
18 However, even then, the lack of liquid secondary 
markets for African securities remained a major obstacle. Indeed, even South Africa, 
looked to by many as a potential Pan-African secondary securities market, has 
suffered from poor liquidity.  
 
However, since the East Asian and other crises, this optimism has declined, and so 
have the equity flows. The main reasons given are that in the second half of the 
1990's, volatility in emerging markets was very high, returns were not only very low, 
(and on occasions negative), but also lower than in the developed markets, and finally 
- as these stock markets become more integrated into global financial markets - 
correlation between emerging and developed markets increased; thus the gains from 
diversification declined.  As a result, the promise that emerging markets would offer a 
higher economic growth and as a result, high returns and no correlation to compensate 
for higher risk was not fulfilled; and the risks were certainly seen as high, as one crisis 
in emerging markets followed another with alarming speed.  
 
There seems to be particularly little interest in investing in low-income countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, as overall disappointment with EMs was reflected in perceptions 
of low-income countries, even though they themselves did not have currency crises. 
One reason given for the unwillingness to invest in Sub-Saharan Africa was lack of 
sufficient and sufficiently regular data. Fund managers and traders argue that to take a 
risk, they need to understand it, which in their context means to quantify it. It is, 
however, unclear to what extent improvement in data (though clearly a necessary 
condition), would be a sufficient one.
19  Amongst the additional pre-conditions 
highlighted for equity flows to grow to SSA was mainly sustained growth; as second 
order factors, improved corporate governance and better rule of law was emphasised 
(see also discussion below in section III). 
 
There emerged also an additional, more structural factor that inhibited equity flows. 
This relates to the fact that - from the point of view of portfolio investors -  
there are not "sufficient" large companies left to invest in.  Many of the most 
attractive, large and profitable companies (e.g. telecoms, energy and others) have 
already been sold to foreign direct investors; this is particularly the case in Latin 
America. As a result, there is no room for portfolio investors.  The remaining 
companies are seen as relatively too small. 
 
Finally, at the time of writing, there was an important cyclical (and thus hopefully 
temporary) element in portfolio equity flows. This relates to projected low-growth in 
developing countries, linked to slow world growth and to the uncertainty following 
the September 11 events. Several fund managers expressed the view that once growth 
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returned to the world economy and emerging markets, and was sustained for a couple 
of years, there would be an increase in equity flows. 
 
An important new trend that has emerged in recent years is that a growing proportion 
of the issuing and trading of developing country stocks takes place in New York and 
London, via issuance of American and Global Drawing Rights (ADRs and GDRs). As 
a consequence, a smaller proportion of this activity takes place in the stock markets of 
developing countries themselves.  It could be said that, to some extent, developing 
countries are exporting their stock markets!  There is here a contrast, between 
international banking - where the analysis and the decision-making of loans by 
international banks to developing countries is increasingly taking place in the 
countries (in local currency); and international equity investment in emerging 
markets, which is increasingly taking place in the major international financial 
centres.  
 
The trend towards more issuance and trading of developing country stocks in the big 
financial centres is not unique; indeed similar trends are found in the smaller 
European countries. This trend is being driven by factors such as deregulation of 
capital flows, falling information costs and a rising preference for liquidity. The main 
factor seems to be investors' increased preference for liquidity. 
 
The increased preference for liquidity has had some temporary elements, in the 
aftermath of the collapse of LTCM and, more recently, linked to the terrorist attacks.  
However, besides temporary after-effects of recent crises and problems, there are also 
important structural factors, which suggest that investors will continue to be biased 
towards more liquid - and therefore larger - markets.  A key factor is that the "crowd" 
of international investors has grown; there is great concentration in huge institutional 
investors, who argue they are "too large" for the market's liquidity; as a result, if they 
switch a significant part of their funds, they can have large effects on prices. A second 
factor is that particularly cross-border investors herd more; according to Persaud 
(2001), the tendency to herd has increased both due to greater uncertainty on 
valuation (as the new economy is based on ideas and knowledge, which are more 
difficult to value than bricks and mortar), and due to the encouragement by regulators 
of short-term, market-sensitive risk management systems, which encourage investors 
with different mandates to act in a similar way.  
 
Given that these latter factors are part of more long-term trends this implies that liquid 
markets will become more liquid while illiquid markets will become less liquid. This 
has been a growing complaint in developing countries, such as Chile and South 
Africa, where large local companies either issue ADRs or switch primary listings 
altogether.  This further undermines liquidity in these developing country markets, as 
overseas investors no longer need to invest there.  A particularly problematic aspect, 
from a development perspective, is that while very large companies will have access 
to international liquidity, relatively smaller companies will not; they will be restricted 
to the small stock markets with declining liquidity. Because medium sized companies 
not only often are more dynamic, but also are an important source of employment, 
this could have negative development implications.  One policy implication that we 
will discuss more below is that stock markets in developing countries may need to 
concentrate on increasing their efficiency in raising capital for small companies. 
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The problem raised above, that relatively small companies are not of interest to 
foreign portfolio equity investors, is also true for international bond placements and 
bank loans. In low-income (and small) developing countries, most indigenous firms 
are relatively small, which seriously restricts their ability to tap directly into 
international financing of any kind. 
 
b.  Bond Flows 
Bond markets continued to fund emerging economies in the post Asian crises period, 
though at a significantly lower level. As the IMF November 2001 Emerging Market 
Financing clearly puts it: "The international bond market, by far the largest provider 
of net financing to emerging markets since the 1990's, and the mainstay of external 
financing for sovereigns, has also been the most volatile provider of such flows…. net 
financing flows on international bond markets to emerging markets has been positive 
in all but three quarters since 1994. Bond financing plays a very small role in funding 
low-income countries, therefore we will discuss this category of flows only fairly 
briefly here. (Also, many of the points discussed in the previous section on equity 
flows are relevant also for bonds). 
 
For those countries that continued to have access to bond finance, two problems have 
emerged since the East Asian crises.  One has been the very high cost of borrowing 
due to very high spreads, at levels well above pre-Asian crisis levels as well as the 
volatility of the cost. The other has been repeated market closures, which seem to be 
becoming more frequent, when issuance dries up.  The IMF 2001 International 
Capital Markets report defines market closures as weeks during which bond issuance 
falls short of 20% of the prior year's weekly average issuance; with this definition, US 
dollar emerging bond markets were closed for 16 weeks during 2000-01.  One of the 
main reasons given for the increasing "on-off" nature of market access is the current 
increased dominance of "cross-over investors" in the investor base of EMs, who can 
easily reduce or eliminate their EM holdings if their outlook deteriorates, if there are 
better opportunities elsewhere, or if their risk aversion grows.  A third feature that has 
emerged since the East Asian crisis is the high concentration of bond lending to 
sovereigns, which is also a reflection of increased risk aversion, and which is 
problematic for developing country corporates. Reportedly, for corporates to be able 
to issue bonds internationally, they have not only to be very creditworthy, but also 
have international partnership or ownership, and have foreign exchange earnings.
20  
 
Reportedly, on balance, especially recently, there is more preference, particularly by 
institutional investors for fixed-income instruments, so as to avoid risk; however, in 
the case of EM bonds, there is also an important fall in appetite for that type of paper 
due to the increased perception of risk.  As a result of recent crises, but especially as 
an effect of the Russian default, the market in emerging market bonds has become far 
more prone to panic in individual countries.  If panic sets in among investors, this can 
undermine even countries with relatively good fundamentals.  After the Russian 
default, investors learned that “having the wrong bond, at the wrong time, with the 
wrong counter-party could lead to complete destruction.” Reportedly, the lesson 
drawn by many fund managers was that if problems emerge in a country, they should 
abandon it entirely, and explain to their clients that the country abandoned could be a 
repeat of Russia. 
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An important further point to stress is that, at least some US investors, mark their 
performance against benchmarks on a daily basis. Large falls in bond values can 
therefore impact very quickly the careers of fund managers, so they will be unwilling 
to stay in bonds that may fall sharply. After the Russian default, reportedly, there is 
also a tendency amongst analysts towards negative bias, in their country analysis, as 
there is strong criticism of analysts who wrote positive reviews on Russia.  
 
Besides the Russian default, bond holders - and their associations - tend to deeply 
resent discussions on orderly debt work-out procedures, which reportedly would 
further discourage new bond lending to emerging markets.  On the other hand, the 
inclusion of collective action clauses (c.a.c.) is not seen as a major problem, 
especially after the UK and Canadian Treasuries issued paper with c.a.c.'s; this is true, 
even in the New York market, where previously there was little tradition of using 
such clauses, but where investors have become more relaxed about their inclusion; 
there may still be a slight concern if a country insists on having such a c.a.c, in that it 
may give a signal that it needs the flexibility, which may show some limitations on its' 
ability to pay. 
 
As regards guarantees or collateralised deals, several market participants valued them, 
and appreciated the possibility of their extension, and/or introduction of more 
innovative mechanisms; other market participants were more sceptical about their 
potential value, arguing that in bad times such measures are not enough to make the 
investment attractive; furthermore, one fund manager argued that collateralised 
markets tend to be less liquid, as their term structure is so different from other 
instruments, and they are not comparable with each other or with other bonds; 
secondly, these instruments are less liquid, because investors tend to buy and hold 
them. 
 
III.  Policy implications 
 
A clear conclusion from our analysis is that private capital flows to developing 
countries have fallen significantly since the East Asian crisis, both for emerging 
markets and for low-income countries. The decline in private flows is caused not only 
by cyclical, but also by more permanent structural factors. 
 
An important and high priority task is to design measures that will encourage a return 
of sufficient private flows to developing countries, especially of more stable flows, 
and particularly to low-income countries. 
 
Measures in source countries 
 
Even before doing so, it seems important to avoid or reduce existing or future 
international measures that further discourage private flows to developing countries. 
A good example is the discussion of the new Basle Capital Accord, where it is 
important that the resulting final Accord does not excessively further discourage bank 
lending to developing countries, increase its cost and its pro-cyclicality
21 
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As regards policy measures to encourage flows, we can distinguish those to be taken 
by: a) recipient countries and b) by developed countries. 
 
Amongst the former, an important area is improving further the level, quality and 
frequency of information on developing countries, as well as its availability. Though 
major efforts have been made, and great progress achieved in this area, interviews 
with market participants showed a further need, especially for low-income countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This is perhaps an area where the new DFID Fund on Codes 
and Standards should provide assistance, both to ascertain exactly what information 
market actors require, and to help countries produce and provide it. Actions in 
developing countries on this issue are discussed in the section on Transparency and 
Monitoring below. 
 
As regards information on developing countries, there are particular categories of 
actors - such as fund managers, and especially pension fund trustees and pension fund 
consultants - who have especially limited information on developing countries, and 
who also seem at present, due to many recent crises, to have an exaggerated 
perception of developing country risk. For this it may be useful to organise 
meetings/conferences with these market actors, developing country representatives 
and some experts on developing countries, to improve information and knowledge on 
these countries.  
 
Other areas highlighted in the interviews with investors and lenders,  where 
improvement would help attract flows are: better legal infrastructures, financial 
regulation and corporate governance.  Emphasis was placed not just on good legal 
frameworks, but also especially on their implementation (for a more detailed 
discussion, see below). 
 
As regards bank lending and bond issuance, an important issue to explore is how to 
better develop and expand public guarantees of loans, especially in periods of 
increased perception of country risk. Mechanisms such as guarantees only on interest 
payments could be explored, as these could provide additional leverage. A 
particularly important area where improved public guarantees could play a big role is 
in encouraging private investment in infrastructure, especially but not only in low-
income countries. 
 
The possibility of using tax incentives also needs to be evaluated carefully, both in 
source and recipient countries.  Could for example, tax relief in developed countries 
to savers for pensions be somewhat higher, if that pension fund invested a somewhat 
higher proportion in long-term investments in developing countries, e.g. with a 
minimum holding period. This would be particularly justified if evidence emerges that 
on average returns on those countries were higher than on other investments.  Or 
could other mechanisms, such as moral arguments for ethical funds, which are an 
increasingly important share of pension fund assets also play a role?  
 
In the case of taxation of pension funds, how in practice would such a mechanism 
work?  Could tax incentives also be used to encourage other investment/lending to 
developing countries?  Measures could also affect market behaviour through other 
mechanisms, e.g. through regulatory ones, or through rules established by the industry QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 37 
   
itself  This could for example be done by encouraging different models to be used by 
different investors and lenders, according to their specific needs and  
characteristics.
22  For example, it has been argued that institutional investors do not 
need such sensitive models as banks, given that they should be prepared to face bigger 
losses.  The use of more appropriate and different models would encourage diversity, 
and therefore discourage herding.  Furthermore, as regards risk management, it is 
necessary also to introduce non-market sensitive elements, including rules of thumb - 
such as for example, increased Spanish provisioning during booms - so as to curb 
excessive volatility.   
 
An innovative suggestion to create countervailing forces to the market's tendency to 
be volatile and pro-cyclical is to attempt to create market stabilisers, via for example 
possible greater use of insurance instruments. Similarly, to deal with liquidity holes in 
emerging markets - either temporary or permanent - there is a need for creating 
market makers. 
 
Finally, as regards bonds, there is the difficult policy issue on how radical and how 
formalised should be ex-ante rules for orderly debt work-outs and standstills in times 
of distress.  This issue has been amply debated. It just seems worthwhile to stress here 
that there are important trade-offs between valuable greater flexibility and speed for 
debt resolution in times of crises (including the existence of an international 
mechanisms to reduce debt in cases of insolvency, which may be very helpful for 
avoiding declines in output or growth) and possibly important negative effects on the 
ability of raising future new money, or increasing its cost significantly. 
 
As regards portfolio equity flows and equity markets, policy actions seem desirable 
not only to attract more equity flows, but also to ensure that a higher share is traded in 
developing countries' stock markets.  One important measure to consider is that of 
creating regional or sub-regional stock markets; important lessons can be here learned 
from Europe, where the smaller stock markets are uniting to pool liquidity. Another 
important measure is that, given that large companies may leave, smaller exchanges 
may need to focus on trying to help raise foreign capital for relatively smaller, but 
potentially dynamic, companies.  As discussed above, a final suggestion that may 
need to be evaluated is whether, particularly in some emerging countries, there are not 
tax or other incentives for "exporting" domestic stock-markets and whether it would 
be feasible and/or worthwhile to modify these. 
 
Recipient country issues 
 
  Reducing risk 
 
Reducing the risk of long-term developing country assets is a priority, if increased 
levels of investment are to be achieved and sustained. The role of political and 
economic stabilisation, and of policy consistency, in reducing the risk of developing 
country assets has received much attention. Indeed, the surge in private capital flows 
in the 1990s has been associated with the increasingly widespread view that the 
market price of (and the market demand for) a country’s assets is the best measure of 
whether the domestic policy framework is appropriate. This practice is not confined to 
the private sector. The IMF has, especially since the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997, 
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adopted the practice of referring regularly to the reaction of financial markets in 
assessing whether the domestic policy actions have been suitable and successful. It is 
worth noting, as discussed elsewhere in this study, that this is a simplistic and 
misleading view of financial markets and market pricing. Crucially, it ignores factors 
on the demand side – such as herding behaviour and changes in risk aversion – that 
have a substantial and sometimes decisive influence on asset prices. 
 
It must nevertheless be recognised that the shift toward market sensitivity is evidence 
that political and economic stability are crucial determinants of the risk of – and hence 
of the price and demand for – a country’s long-term assets. There is now abundant 
empirical evidence of the link between stability and inflows. As discussed above, 
successful stabilisation efforts in countries such as Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania 
and South Africa has been associated with sharp rises in direct investment inflows, 
while the recent turbulence in Zimbabwe has led to a collapse in inward investment. 
 
Political and macroeconomic stabilisation are, however, only the first steps that 
governments must take. The need for a range of measures aimed at risk reduction is 
recognised in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), formerly 
known as the New African Initiative, as discussed in the text box below. In many 
countries, investing firms (domestic as well as foreign) continue to face a host of 
regulatory and political risks. Political risks include the risk of expropriation, 
deprivation, currency convertibility and transferability, contract enforcement and 
political violence. Regulatory risks arise from arbitrary or politically-motivated 
changes in regulatory rules or their enforcement, and is a critical issue for investment 
in infrastructure. 
 
The problem is most acute in low-income countries where legislative and regulatory 
systems tend to be least developed. Investing firms depend critically on these systems, 
from investment approvals to licensing, from taxation to foreign exchange transfers. 
Underdeveloped systems, unclear guidelines or criteria, and inconsistent 
implementation (or enforcement) can all contribute to a high degree of uncertainty in 
the effective returns on potential investments – thereby needlessly discouraging 
worthwhile projects. 
 
There is a need, above all, for policy consistency. Investors must have confidence that 
the “rules of the game” will not change, and that they will be applied in a consistent 
manner to all investments and all investors. Effective policy consistency requires, in 
turn, that policies and decisions be transparent and enforcement predictable. 
Naturally, this should not sacrifice countries’ autonomy in changing crucial policies, 
such as taxation, if the economic circumstances require. 
 
The NEPAD proposal that countries undertake audits of regulation and legislation, 
followed up by monitored action plans to address any weaknesses, deserves the 
strongest support. But it must, at the same time, be recognised that existing systems 
and practices have evolved in response to political and social pressures and cannot 
simply be changed overnight. Even a sustained effort to tackle these issues is likely to 
be fully successful only in the medium to long term. 
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  Risk mitigation 
 
A separate but related issue is the scope for measures to mitigate the risks faced by 
foreign investors in developing country assets. The reduction of those risks through 
measures such as those discussed above is clearly a priority. However, it must be 
recognised that even if such measures are successful, developing countries, especially 
low-income countries, are likely to remain higher risk environments. In part, this 
stems from the lack of diversification in the production side of most of these 
economies, which renders them more vulnerable to changes in world prices and in 
technology. In part, it stems from the restricted set of instruments for risk 
management in these countries, which makes a broader range of risks undiversifiable. 
And in part, it stems from their vulnerability to the knock-on effects of policy or 
behavioural changes in developed countries (e.g., of the Basle II Capital Accord, see, 
for example, Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2001, and Reisen, 2001). 
 
For these reasons, policies to reduce risk should be accompanied by initiatives aimed 
at mitigating risks faced by investors. The demand for such instruments was 
demonstrated by the rapid expansion of private political risk insurance as private 
investment into developing country infrastructure projects grew in the 1990s. Political 
risk insurance and investment guarantees (full and partial) are provided by 
multilateral development banks, export credit agencies and investment insurers, as 
well as private insurers.
23 
 
The NEPAD Private Capital Flows Initiative proposes that consideration be given to 
supplementing this traditional risk insurance in three ways. The first is the possible 
establishment of an African currency convertibility fund to address the transfer and 
convertibility risk of projects that do not produce foreign exchange. The second is the 
greater use of “B-loans”, whereby multilateral banks leverage private funding by 
syndicating, to private banks, a portion of their loans. The third is the eventual 
establishment of an African derivative market to enable investors to unbundle the 
various risks of cross-border investment.
24 Much work is needed before it will be 
clear whether these initiatives, especially the first and third, are worth pursuing. But 
the potential benefits in each case are clearly sufficient to justify proceeding with the 
initial evaluation. 
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  Transparency and monitoring capacity 
 
The role of imperfect information in impeding investment and, especially, in 
triggering instability has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Indeed, 
perhaps the only concrete achievement of the extensive discussions of financial 
stability and international financial architecture – which date from the immediate 
aftermath of the Tequila crisis in 1994-5, and gained pace with the Asian crisis – has 
been the development and implementation of international codes and standards. This 
initiative reflected the view that a lack of transparency regarding country policies and 
data had played an important role in the crises in Mexico and Thailand, among others. 
These crises illustrated how imperfect information on a country’s macroeconomic and 
financial position can contribute to the misallocation of investment flows, aggravating 
booms and delaying necessary policy adjustments (although other factors can play an 
equally important role). 
 
The spread of international codes and standards, has to a limited extent, been 
supported by an increase in the demand for information by investors. The growth of 
emerging market research departments at major international banks in the mid-1990s 
and the associated proliferation of weekly and monthly publications highlighted the 
demand not only for comprehensive and accurate information, but for timely, high 
frequency data as well. It is telling that the downturn in flows to emerging markets in 
the past two years has been associated with heavy retrenchments in these research 
departments and their publications. 
 
Developing countries have made considerable progress in this area in recent years, as 
exemplified by the adoption of SDDS and GDDS data dissemination guidelines 
promulgated by the IMF. The need for policy coordination and regulatory 
harmonisation has also been widely endorsed among developing countries. The near 
universal implementation of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord is one example of this. A 
more ambitious, if specific, example is the current project within the fourteen 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries to create a standard 
legal, regulatory and technological framework for national payment systems in 
Southern Africa. 
 
The data dissemination standards have highlighted the need for improved data capture 
and analysis of private capital flows. Effective monitoring and analysis is essential not 
only to data dissemination, but also to informed policy decisions. Indeed, a lack of 
capacity in this area increases the risk of bad policy while also obscuring potential 
economic risks. Through a series of projects over the past four years, the Centre for 
Research into Economics and Finance in Southern Africa (CREFSA), at the London 
School of Economics, and Development Finance International (DFI) have worked 
with a range of country teams throughout Africa, and elsewhere, in developing 
strategies to enhance the monitoring and analysis of private capital flows. These 
projects have highlighted the scale of the mismeasurement and non-recording of 
private capital flows in developing countries, and of the human and financial 
resources needed to address these problems effectively. 
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Thus, in addition to implementing codes and standards, developing countries need 
support in their efforts to improve their capacity to monitor and analyse private capital 
flows. Only if such capacity is strengthened significantly can the benefits of 
transparency be realised. More importantly, only if such capacity is strengthened will 
policy-makers be in a position to manage effectively the challenges posed by volatile 
capital flows. 
 
  Property rights and institutional development 
 
A number of papers in recent years have demonstrated the important role of property 
rights in determining the demand for a country’s long-term assets, and hence the 
availability of external finance.
25 These studies have shown that the more protected is 
the property right of a particular asset the higher will be the level of foreign demand 
for the asset. Of fundamental importance, however, are basic property rights including 
the effective enforcement of contracts. The development and quality of the legal 
system influences the range of financial instruments available and also the nature of 
creditor (and equity) rights – both of which feed directly into the demand for a 
country’s assets. 
 
Recent studies have shown how property rights also affect the demand for long-term 
assets indirectly. Property rights work in a variety of ways to facilitate financial sector 
development (La Porta et al, 1998), which, in turn, seems to affect growth (Levine, 
1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Property rights also seem to exert a separate 
influence on growth.
26 In both cases, the higher levels of growth, resulting from 
further development of property rights, work to stimulate increased demand for the 
country’s long-term assets. Yet another conduit has been suggested in a recent paper 
by Claessens et al (2001), which presents evidence that property rights are 
particularly important for the establishment of new firms. 
 
The issue of property rights is closely related to the issues of governance and of 
institutional development. The establishment of property rights requires the 
development of effective legal, political and social institutions, but, at the same time, 
facilitates their further development. While creditor rights must, of course, have a 
legal basis, they are not effectual in the absence of effective governance. For these 
reasons, initiatives aimed broadly at institutional development and governance can 
play a critical role in the development of property rights in general and creditor rights 
in particular. 
 
The Asian crisis has highlighted the importance of effective financial regulation and 
supervision in reducing the risk of financial crises and in limiting financial instability 
when crises do occur. When supervision is weak, surges in capital inflows can lead to 
a sharp rise in non-performing assets, as cheap funds are made available to less 
creditworthy borrowers and loans are made on the collateral of inflated asset prices. 
The rise in non-performing assets increases the fragility of the financial system, 
making crises more likely and sharply raising the costs of adjustment should a crisis 
occur. By reducing the likelihood and impact of crises, steps to strengthen regulatory 
and supervisory capacity can contribute to increases in the demand for a country’s 
long-term assets. As discussed in Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin (1999), 
                                                                 
25 See, for example, La Porta et al, 1997, 1998; North, 1990; Mansfield, 1995 
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measures such as introducing capital requirements and limits on the foreign exchange 
exposure of banks, and supervisory oversight of credit allocation and internal risk 
management can reduce the vulnerability of the financial sector. Reforms along these 
lines in Uganda, following the Financial Institutions Act of 1993, seem to have played 
an important role in strengthening the financial sector and in attracting higher levels 
of foreign investment, as have similar reforms in Tanzania, Mauritius and elsewhere. 
 
 
  Trade costs and market access 
 
A crucial factor influencing the demand for long-term developing country assets is the 
small and segmented nature of the domestic market in most such countries, and the 
lack of access to larger markets. The problem is most pronounced in low-income 
countries, where mass consumer demand is restricted to a narrow range of 
commodities and the market for other, higher value-added consumer and intermediate 
goods is limited. Empirical studies of the factors driving direct investment have 
highlighted market size and market access as decisive determinants of location 
decisions (see, for example, Markusen, 1995, Devereux and Griffith, 1998). These 
findings are confirmed by evidence from surveys of investing firms, which show 
market size and access to be a major obstacle to investment in developing countries, 
especially low-income countries (see, for example, the findings of a recent CREFSA-
CSAE survey of direct investors into Southern Africa summarised in Jenkins and 
Thomas, forthcoming). 
 
The “new trade theory” has focused on these factors – market size and market access 
– as issues of trade costs. The new trade theory begins with the recognition that, as 
shown by Krugman (1980) and others, such costs have a fundamental influence on the 
level and direction of trade. This implies, in turn, that such costs have a decisive 
influence on the location of production, and consequently on the level and direction of 
long-term investment flows. Firms’ investment decisions therefore take into account 
not only the direct costs and benefits of investing in a particular location, but also the 
trade costs associated with exporting to and from that market. 
 
Trade costs are a prominent feature of the international economic environment, but 
are particularly pronounced in low-income countries, where weak transport and 
communications infrastructure are typically compounded by high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. As discussed, for example, in Maasdorp (2000), the problem of high 
transportation and communications costs is common throughout Africa, and is 
particularly acute for the smaller, landlocked countries. The costs of surface transport 
have been driven up by decades of underinvestment in national railways in most 
countries. This, in turn, has forced freight onto the roads, resulting in an increase in a 
volume and axle loads of road traffic far in excess of the capacity of existing road 
network. Air transport remains appropriate only for high-value, low volume freight, 
while sea transport has been impeded by underinvestment in harbour infrastructure. 
Moreover, direct transport costs are only one component of the total delivered cost, 
which also includes trans-shipment charges, storage and distribution charges, losses 
through theft or damage, and delays. For example, at South Africa-Zimbabwe border 
crossing Beit Bridge, vehicles have long faced delays of several days waiting to clear 
customs. In war-affected regions, unofficial (and unpredictable) road blocks have 
sharply raised the costs and risks of transport. (Maasdorp, 2000)  Communications QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 43 
   
costs, too, tend to be high. The spread of mobile telephony has brought down the costs 
of voice communication in many parts of Africa. The limited fixed line network, 
however, continues to impede the roll-out of electronic mail and internet access. 
 
Equally important, however, have been the policy-related trade costs – in the form of 
taxes, tariffs and non-tariff barriers – that frequently impede intra-regional trade, 
especially among low-income countries. Africa has a long history of initiatives aimed 
at regional trade liberalisation. A few have been successful, notably the Southern 
African Customs Union, which is the oldest customs union in the world. Most, 
however, have achieved very little. Jenkins, Leape and Thomas (2000) argue that 
Africa’s poor record in designing sustainable regional frameworks is largely due to 
three factors. The first is poor design: schemes have failed to take into account 
members’ divergent interests, the feasibility of implementation, the incentives to 
comply and the scope for substituting non-tariff barriers for tariffs. The second is the 
persistence of domestic policies that conflict with the trade reforms, a problem 
Jenkins et al go on to examine in depth. The third is the insufficient attention given to 
the problems created by weak national institutions and infrastructure. All of these 
factors must be addressed if progress is to be made in establishing regional markets in 
Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. 
 
Recent years have, however, seen some positive developments in this area. The 
democratic transition in South Africa has led to a new Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Free Trade Protocol, the implementation of which has been 
boosted by strong ministerial commitment and by South African offers of asymmetric 
tariff reduction. In addition, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (see text 
box below) has mobilised high level political support for trade integration throughout 
Africa. 
 
Another development in the 1990s was the Cross Border Initiative (CBI). Launched in 
August 1993, with the support of the African Development Bank, the European 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, the CBI has had 
two objectives: to reduce cross-border transaction costs by reducing intra-regional 
tariffs, liberalising exchange and payments systems, and deregulating investment; and 
to promote an “open” approach to regionalism, based on across-the-board reductions 
in effective rates of protection (rather than import substitution and high protection). 
Although the increases in trade openness achieved by the fourteen African countries 
participating in the initiative have only slightly exceeded those of non-participating 
countries in the region, the most successful liberalisers, Uganda and Zambia, have 
reached the openness levels of Chile and Singapore. Moreover, the technical working 
groups created under the initiative have contributed to increased institutional capacity, 




A third and crucial component of the trade costs facing investors in low-income 
countries is the high costs of exporting to the major developed countries. As with 
regional trade, one of the obstacles is the magnitude of transport and related economic 
costs. But, policy-related trade costs in the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers are of 
crucial importance. 
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Although average tariff levels in developed countries have been steadily reduced as a 
result of global trade negotiations, high tariff peaks and tariff escalation continue to 
pose a major obstacle to low-income country exports. While the average normal 
(MFN) tariff rate in industrial countries is due to fall to less than four percent 
following the Uruguay round, a range of key agricultural exports face average tariff 
duties of more than 15 percent. Moreover, the preferential access given to African 
countries is undermined by the massive domestic support to agriculture in the major 
developed countries, while export subsidies given by these countries distort 
international trade and drive otherwise competitive African agricultural exports out of 
the market. At the same time, tariff escalations – rising tariffs from raw materials to 
intermediate and finished products – work to limit developing country opportunities 
for moving up the value chain in agro-processing and other manufactured exports, 
which now account for more than 60 percent of total African export earnings.
28 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that, in the area of trade costs and market access, 
the single most important factor impeding long-term investment into low-income 
countries is the lack of access to developed country markets. Despite their apparently 
strong public commitment to trade liberalisation, the major industrial countries 
continue to have tariff schedules and non-tariff barriers that systematically restrict 
access for key developing country exports. No factor is likely to have as strong an 
impact on the price and attractiveness of long-term developing country assets as 
would concerted action by the major industrial countries to reduce effective rates of 
protection in these areas. 
 
                                                                 
28 See NEPAD, 2001, “An Action Plan for Market Access” 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS89   Page 45 
   
 
   
Text Box: The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), formerly known as the New African Initiative, brings 
together the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega Plan. 
NEPAD is an initiative of African leaders, initiated by President Mbeki of South Africa in partnership with 
Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Bouteflika of Algeria and now led by a Steering Committee also including 
Egypt and Senegal. The initiative is aimed at eradicating poverty and achieving sustainable development and 
growth.  
 
NEPAD includes a range of measures, under the various constituent initiatives, aimed at creating an 
environment attractive to private capital. 
 
•  Measures set out under the Political Environment for Sustainable Development Initiative and the 
Economic Governance Initiative will reduce political and economic instability – and thus the risks of 
investing in Africa. 
 
•  Measures set out under the Infrastructure Initiative aim to improve the level and quality of infrastructure in 
transportation, communication, power and water, while proposals of the MAP ICT and Poverty Reduction 
Initiatives set out programmes to rectify the deficiencies in Africa’s human capital. 
 
•  Measures set out under the International Trade and Market Access Initiative are aimed at accelerating 
intra-African trade and increasing access to the markets of industrialised countries. The proposed action 
plan includes efforts to strengthen capacity in trade policy; to improve preferential trading arrangements 
(and their benefits for investment); to improve Africa’s participation in the WTO; and to deepen regional 
integration and regional trade liberalisation. 
 
NEPAD also includes a programme aimed solely at stimulating greater inflows of private capital: the MAP 
Private Capital Flows Initiative. The Private Capital Flows Initiative has three areas of focus: 
 
•  The first is measures to reduce and mitigate the political and regulatory risks of investments in Africa. To 
reduce risks, countries will be expected to undertake audits of regulation and legislation related to 
investment and to draw up “monitorable action plans” to address any weaknesses. To mitigate risks, the 
initiative calls for enhanced use of credit guarantee schemes through multilateral institutions to leverage 
long-term private capital and proposes that consideration be given to creating an African Currency 
Convertibility Fund to address foreign exchange transfer risk for investments not generating foreign 
exchange. 
 
•  The second is measures to “enhance Africa’s capacity to engage directly with private investors through 
public private partnerships (PPP)”. Such partnerships are seen as vital to mobilising private finance for 
infrastructure projects. It is proposed that the technical expertise to structure particular transactions be 
concentrated in regional development banks, with complementary capacity developed in individual 
countries. 
 
•  The third is measure to accelerate the harmonisation of financial markets. The initiative recognises that 
attracting private capital will require reliable and increasingly sophisticated financial and legal systems, 
which can only be achieved through the harmonisation of Africa’s financial markets. 
 
In addition to the private capital flows initiative, the broader “MAP Capital Flows Initiative” calls for an 
increase in official flows to Africa through increased and accelerated debt relief and through increases in 
aid and changes in how aid is delivered. 
 
•  The MAP Debt Relief initiative highlights the continuing debt burden and calls for the basis of debt relief to 
be broadened beyond “debt sustainability” to focus on the need to free domestic resources to finance 
poverty reduction and development programmes. 
 
•  The MAP ODA Reform Initiative calls for an increase in the level of net ODA flows to Africa in line with the 
agreed International Development Goals for 2015. The initiative also calls for a reform of the aid delivery 
system to increase the involvement of domestic stakeholders in the definition of development priorities 
and to enhance Africa’s capacity to manage aid effectively towards the goal of poverty reduction. 
 
Source:  The New Partnership for African Development, October 2001, An Action Plan for Market Access for 
Africa’s Exports, and Capital Flows Initiative (both undated) from www.africainitiative.org 
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Annex 1: Data availability and limitations 
 
The data presented in this paper are drawn from a variety of sources, including 
International Capital Markets, Emerging Markets Financing Quarterly and World 
Economic Outlook  published by the IMF, the World Bank Global Development 
Finance 2001 and 2002 databases, the joint OECD-BIS-World Bank-IMF external 
debt statistics,  the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2001 database on foreign direct 
investment and Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies, published by the 
Institute for International Finance.  While many common trends emerge from the data 
from these different sources, there are also discrepancies. These discrepancies are 
symptomatic of underlying methodological problems with some of these data. 
Amongst the reasons for differences between different sources are: treatment of 
capital flight, country coverage, and whether net bank lending is measured on its' 
own, or minus deposits.
29 
 
There are, for example, difficulties in capturing data on portfolio flows – as evidenced 
by the attention given to this area at the IMF, with the recent coordinated portfolio 
survey, and elsewhere. Problems in monitoring portfolio flows include the difficulties 
of tracking secondary market transactions, which may take place in third countries, 
and of establishing beneficial ownership in the presence of nominee companies and 
similar devices. 
 
Even more importantly for low-income countries, Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and 
Martin (1999) show that the World Bank and IMF data, and even the official country 
data, do not fully capture the flows of direct investment to developing countries. In a 
study of five African countries carried out in association with local central bank 
teams, Bhinda et al show that problems of data capture and analysis of private capital 
flows are common throughout Africa. Flows through certain institutions, such as 
bureaux de change, are notoriously difficult to monitor (as even the UK has recently 
admitted). In other cases, the recording institutions – typically banks – may be unable 
to distinguish different types of flows (such as direct investment versus private 
transfers), resulting in misrecording. 
 
While these international data on capital flows are, nevertheless, the most useful 
available source of information for assessing the overall pattern of capital flows, the 
above caveats mean that any conclusions drawn must be treated with a degree of 
caution. 
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